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Article 8

OIL AND GAS IN CALIFORNIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL NECESSITY OF RECOGNIZING CORRELATIVE RIGHTS IN REGULATING PRODUCTION TO PREVENT SURFACE NUISANCES'
By ERNEST T.

HUBBARD, TIMOTHY

F.

MCMAHON, ALFRED C. PAULDEN

and JOHN A. VAN RYN
Constitutional regulation of oil and gas production in the United States
is based upon either: (1) prevention of waste of natural resources; (2) protection of "correlative rights" of other owners over the "field," or (3) prevention of surface nuisances. 2 In regulations based upon the first two of these
police powers the courts of California and the United States have recognized
that oil and gas are different from other minerals and require special terms
in order to avoid violation of the Due Process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.? It is submitted that this
difference in nature also requires special types of regulation in the prevention of surface nuisance, and that the failure of the California Legislature
and courts to recognize this can result in laws and decisions which might
deprive some owners of constitutional rights in property.

The Physical Nature of Oil and Gas and PropertyRights Therein
Oil and gas, in their natural state, are found in underground "reservoirs." 4 They are distinguishable from other minerals in that they are fluid
and will move when there are changes in the underground pressures., Oil
and gas differ from water in that they do not usually flow until some unusual
occurrence causes the pressure to change. Such a change may result from
natural causes or from the puncturing of the overhead cap by a man-made
'This comment purports to deal only with the constitutional aspects of regulation of oil and
gas well drilling and operation in California, with a suggested approach for use in drafting legislation and interpretation of existing legislation. The main emphasis is upon the problem as it
exists in California at this date. Cases from other jurisdictions are resorted to in development of
the California view as to the nature of the property right in oil, and to present the constitutional
aspects of regulation.
21 SumBIERS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OIL AND GAS § 106 (1938).
Warrs v. City of Oxford, 32 F.2d 134 (8th Cir., 1929); Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal.2d 773,
177 P.2d 913 (1947).
"'Reservoir" is a popular word used to describe the physical phenomenon which contains oil
and gas in quantities and under pressures at depths economically profitable to tap. This phenomenon usually consists of a folded, porous stratum, saturated with oil and gas under pressure,
bottomed by water and overlain with an impervious rock cap. 1 Summers op. cit., supra, § 4.
Also, see PoGuE, ECONOMIcS OF THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY (1939); VAN TUYL, ELEMENTS OF
PETROLEUM GEOLOGY ch. 7 (1924); ZIEGLER, POPULAR OIL GEOLOGY ch. 7 (1924); UREN, PETROLEUM PRODUCTION ENGINEERING 18-33 (1950) ; LANDES, PETROLEUM GEOLOGY ch. 8 (1st ed. 1951).
'Summers, op. cit. supra, note 2 at § 4; Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas 31 CALIF L. REv. 357,
360 (1943). For a discussion of reservoir pressures see Landes, op. cit. supra, 100-105.
( 173 )
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well. Oil and gas seek the point of least pressure so that through one oil
well a person may capture oil from a large area.6

The fluidity of oil and its tendency to flow to lower pressure areas permit
it to be drawn across the boundaries of parcels of land overlying the pool.
Since the cases unanimously recognize that the presence of the subterranean

oil and gas give some type of property right in the owner of the surface'
the drawing of these minerals across boundary lines has created problems

peculiar to oil and gas, and has required new concepts of property to
permit legal analysis of the resulting situations.
The courts in early cases concerning oil and gas saw the problem as one

of mineral rights in the common law sense. The courts reasoned that if oil
was a mineral it should give rise to the same rights as exist in other minerals

such as coal and gold. This was the "Vested Rights" or "Ownership in Place"
theory which recognized "absolute dominion" of the surface owner in the
oil beneath his land.' Many states still adhere to a modified form of this
theory.9 The early California cases seemed to adopt the "Ownership in
Place" theory.' 9 The disadvantages in this theory became apparent with

increasing geological knowledge of the nature of petroleum oil and gas;
it soon became apparent that production from Blackacre would reduce the
pressure under the surface so that if there was not a corresponding reduction of pressure on adjacent Whiteacre (through drilling on Whiteacre
itself) oil and gas would flow across the boundary. If there is a vested

right in that gas and oil, the person drilling on Blackacre would have committed a trespass of a type on Whiteacre, since oil remains part of the realty

6
"Just how far and to what extent a given well in a particular oil or gas reservoir will drain
the oil or gas from the surrounding territory is a problem of several unknowns, the chief of which
are the coarseness of the oil and gas sand, the amount of pressure and the force of the vacuum
created by pumping. It is an established fact (that) oil and gas wells do drain the surrounding
territory.". 1 Summers, op. cit. supra, § 4. Also, see Landes, op. cit. supra, ch. 6; HA-ER, PRACTICAL

OIL GEOLOGY 112 (1st ed. 1915).

"Brown v. Spillman, 155 U.S. 665 (1895) ; United Fuel Gas Co. v. Swiss Oil Corp., 41 F.2d 4
(6th Cir., 1930); Richfield Oil Co. of California v. Hercules Gasoline Co., 112 CalApp. 431,
297 Pac. 73 (1931) ; Stone v. City of Los Angeles, 114 Cal.App. 192, 299 Pac. 838 (1931) ; Hager
v. Stokes, 116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927).
"The Appeal of Stoughton et al., 88 Pa. St. 198, 201 (1878) ; Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa.St. 229
(1866) ; Hague v. Wheeler, 157 Pa.St. 324, 27 At. 714 (1893).
'Moses, The Constitutional, Legislative, and Judicial Growth of Oil and Gas Conservation
Statutes, 13 Miss. L.J., 353, 357-359 (1941). Moses stated that the "Ownership in Place" doctrine
has been adopted in Arkansas, Kansas, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, New Mexico, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas, and West Virginia.
"0 Brookshire Oil Co. v. Casmalia Oil Co., 156 Cal. 211, 103 Pac. 927 (1909) ; Isom v. Rex Crude
Oil Co., 147 Cal. 659, 82 Pac. 317 (1905); Bartholomae Oil Corp. v. Delaney, 112 Cal.App. 314,
296 Pac. 690 (1931).
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until severed therefrom. 1 No state has carried the "Ownership in Place"
doctrine that far.' 2
There are today two main theories regarding the nature of rights in oil
and gas beneath the surface: (1) the "Defeasible Fee" theory, and (2) the
"Correlative Rights" theory. Under the first theory the surface owner owns
all of the subsurface minerals subject to defeasance by the flow of oil and
gas beyond his boundaries, such flow not being caused by a physical crossing
of the boundary by a well or other apparatus. 3 Under the second theory,
all of the persons owning the surface over the pool have a like interest in
the pool, with the right in each to reduce to possession as much as he can so
long as he does not unduly harm the correlative rights of his fellow owners. 4
Under either theory all owners have the right to use their land to recover as

much oil as possible from the pool, with certain limitations."
Under the correlative rights theory the surface owners have in the oil
and gas only the right to drill and capture. This right is an incident to their
surface ownership; each owner has the physical power to deprive the others
of that right by drilling and thereby causing the oil to flow to the low
"1Brown v. Spillman, 155 U.S. 665 (1895) ; Davis v. Atlantic Oil Producing Co., 87 F.2d 75
(5th Cir. 1937); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Swiss Oil Corp., 41 F.2d 4 (6th Cir. 1930); Isom v.
Rex Crude Oil Co., 147 Cal. 659, 82 Pac. 317 (1905) ; Beam v. Dugan, 132 Cal.App. 546, 23 P.2d 58

(1933).2

" Even the Pennsylvania courts admitted that once oil migrated across a boundary it became
the property of the person to whose land it had migrated. Jones v. Forest Oil Co., 194 Pa.St. 379,
44 AtL3 1074 (1900).
" Texas has qualified its doctrine of "Ownership in Place" by recognizing a "defeasible fee"
in the oil while in place, the defeasance occurring upon flowing away of the oil and gas. Magnolia
Petroleum v. Blankenship, 85 F.2d 553 (1936) ; Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 146 Tex. 575, 210 S.W.2d
558 (1948) ; Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Co., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935) ; Hager v.
Stokes, 116 Tex. 453, 294 S.W. 835 (1927); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 107 Tex. 226, 176 S.W. 717
(1915).
"'The correlative rights theory supposes that all who own the surface over a producing reservoir
own an interest in the whole of the oil in the reservoir. Each owns the right to drill and capture
the oil and gas, thus transforming them into personalty. No one owns any given drop of oil until
it is captured. "We therefore hold that the title to natural gas does not vest in any private owner
until it is reduced to actual possession, and therefore that the act . . . is not violative of the
constitution as an unwarranted interference with private property." Indiana v. Ohio Oil Co.,
150 Ind. 21, 32, 49 N.E. 809, 812 (1898). The correlative right is viewed ". . . not necessarily
as a right to a fixed distribution or proportional share of the oil and gas underlying the surface,
which no other owner of the soil overlying the same reservoir may take and use beneficially, but
as a coequal right to take whatever of the oil and gas can be captured, so long as waste, as defined
by the statute, is not committed." People v. Associated Oil Co., 211 Cal. 93, 103, 294 Pac. 717, 722
(1930). "An interest or estate in real property in the nature of a profit a prendre which is an
incorporeal hereditament." Callahan v. Martin, 3 Cal.2d 110, 118, 43 P.2d 788 (1935). Also, see
Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) ; In re Lathrop, 61 F.2d 37 (9th Cir., 1952) ; Bernstein
v. Bush, 29 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947) ; Tanner v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., 20 Cal.2d 814,
129 P.2d 383 (1942) ; Dabney-Johston Oil Corp. v. Walden, 4 CaL2d 637, 52 P.2d 237 (1935);
Townsend v. State, 147 Ind. 624, 47 N.E. 19 (1897).
"5"The common right and correlative right refer only to the fact that a surface owner is entitled
to capture all of the oil, gas, and hydrocarbons that may, by hydrostatic or other pressure, be caused
to impregnate the oil strata beneath his own property, and reduce the same to possession by
bringing them to the surface through wells drilled upon and bottomed underneath his surface
location... ." A. E. Bell Corp. v. Bell View Syndicate et al.,
24 Cal.App.2d 587, 595, 76 P.2d 167
(1938). Also, see Brown v. Humble Oil and Refining Corp., 126 Tex. 296, 83 S.W.2d 935 (1935).
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pressure area thus created beneath land. Conversely, each owner has the

physical power to protect his right by drilling and reducing the pressure
under his own land so that there will be no appreciable difference in pressure
in different parts of the field to cause a flow of the subsurface oil away from
under his land.
In both the "Defeasible Fee" and "Correlative Rights" theories, there
is also recognized the right to contract with respect to oil and gas, and to
execute lease agreements concerning them. The entire complex of rights
surrounding the oil and gas beneath the surface and their utilization, is
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, especially by the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses thereof.'"
The Police Power of the States to Regulate the Use of Property
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution permits
the states to "reasonably" regulate the use of property for the protection
and improvement of the public health and safety." Such restrictions are
valid to the extent that they are reasonable in the light of the balancing of
the interests involved,'" i.e., the public need for the measures as against
the deprivation to the person whose property is being subjected to regulation."0 A restriction upon the use of property may be so great that it amounts
to a taking20 and can be sustained only where the means used are reasonable
in view of the valid end to be attained. 2 ' Regulations to promote health and
safety are more subject to attack when the number of persons benefited is so
22
small that there is in effect only a private benefit conferred.
""On the other hand, the surface proprietors vwithin the gas field all have the right to reduce
to possession the gas and oil beneath. They could not be absolutely deprived of this right, which
belongs to them, without a taking of private property . . . then as a necessary result of the right
of property, its indivisible quality, and the peculiar position of the things to which it relates, there
must arise the legislative power to protect the right of property from destruction." Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 209 (1899). Also, see Marrs v. City of Oxford, 24 F.2d 541 (D.C. 1928) ;
Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947). "... . an owner who by virtue of his
ownership of land or of mining leases thereof has the vested right to draw by wells or pumps
natural gas from beneath the surface is the owner of valuable property which the state cannot take
away from him without just compensation... ." Haskell v. Cowham, 187 Fed. 403, 412 (8th Cir.
1911). Accord Spring Valley Water Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 165 Fed. 667 (C.C.
N.D. Cal. 1908).
"'Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933); Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582
(1929) ; Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) ; Reiman v. Little Rock,
237 U.S. 171 (1915) ; Dobbins v. City of Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223 (1904).
"The due process requirement of the United States Constitution permits regulation of the use
of private property to such extent as is necessary to protect an essential public interest. Compare
United Enterprises v. Dubey, 128 F.2d 843 (5th Cir. 1942) with Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced
County, 67 F.Supp. 598 (S.D. Cal., 1946).
"Queeside Hills Realty Co. v. Sax], 328 U.S. 80 (1945) ; Compagnie Francaise de Navigation
A Vapeur v. Louisiana State Board of Health, 186 U.S. 380 (1902).
"Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922); Tebbets v. McElroy, 56 F.2d 621
(W.D. Missouri, 1932).
"Coblentz v. Sparks, 35 F. Supp. 605 (S.D. Ohio, 1940) ; U. S. v. Heinrich, 12 F.2d 938 (Montana, 1926).
"Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Nebraska ex. rel. Board of Transportation, 164 U.S. 403 (1896).
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However, if there is a valid public interest in health or safety to be
protected, and if the regulatory means used are reasonable, the person whose
property is regulated cannot demand compensation, since each person holds
his property subject to such restrictions.23
With respect to private nuisances, there is no property right to commit
acts which unduly interfere with the use of property by others, and therefore abatement of such conditions give rise to no right to compensation in
the defendant.2 4
In the prevention of surface nuisances the states have unquestioned constitutional power to regulate the drilling and operation of wells.2" Such
regulations have been interpreted as protection against both public and
private nuisances. Courts sometimes discuss regulation of spacing of wells
in relation to prevention of spreading of fire to neighboring wells; this would
be akin to a private nuisance.2 6 At other times the regulations are discussed
as lessening the danger to persons traveling on the public highway;27 this is
recognition of the public nuisance aspect."
"Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503 (1944) ; Ambler Realty Co. v. City of Euclid, 272 U.S.
365 (1926) ; Welch v. Swasey, 214 U.S. 91 (1907) ; Sweet v. Rechel, 159 U.S. 380 (1895).
"'Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas. "... . a balance of reasonable users as between owners
of neighboring properties must be struck, and any use of land by one of the parties which is in
violation of this balance, unreasonably interfering with the rights of enjoyment of the others,
is a nuisance, a wrong punished by the courts since the beginning of the common law." NWALSH,
A TREATISE ON EQUITY 170 (1st ed. 1930).
2
-See cases collected in YOAKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRACTICE § 192, note 63 (1st ed. 1948).
Cf. Standard Oil Co. v. Marysville, 279 U.S. 582 (1929); Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los
Angeles, 47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir., 1931). Compare Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933) with
Pacific Palisades Assn. v. City of Huntington Beach, 196 Cal. 211, 237 Pac. 538 (1925).
""The purposes of the legislation are stated in the title to be the protection of persons and
property against danger from fire and explosion in oil and gas wells when operated in proximity
to public streets and to other wells." (Emphasis added.) Larson v. Bush, 29 Cal.App.2d 43, 45,
83 P.2d 955 (1938). Cf. Sindell v. Smutz, 100 CaLApp.2d 10, 14, 222 P.2d 903 (1950).
"""While oil and gas wells are not nuisances per se ... it is conceivable that they may become
detrimental in a high degree ...

unless the

. . .

structures be kept at a safe distance from the

railway tracks, life and property might be endangered. . . ." Winkler v. Anderson, 104 Kan. 1, 2,
177 Pac. 521, 522 (1919).
sln the following discussion the term "nuisance" will be used to include both of these aspects.
A nuisance is "anything that unlawfully worketh hurt, inconvenience, or damhge." 3 BL. Coiam. 216.
A public nuisance is "one which affects an indefinite number of persons, or all of the residents
of a particular locality, or all people coming within the extent of its range or operation, although
the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon individuals may be unequal." Black's Law
Dictionary (3d ed., 1933). See City of Georgetown v. Alexandria Canal Co., 37 U.S. 91 (1838);
Soap Corporation of America v. Reynolds, 178 F.2d 503 (5th Cir. 1950).
A private nuisance "includes any wrongful act which destroys or deteriorates the property
of an individual or of a few persons or interferes with their lawful use or enjoyment thereof ..
Black, op. cit. supra, p. 1264.
The term "nuisance" vill not be used to indicate a waste of natural resources which, though
against the public interest, is related to the conservation aspects of the police power. For cases
recognizing this public interest see Thompson v. Consolidated Gas Utilities Corp., 300 U.S. 55
(1937) ; Walls v. Midland Carbon Co., 254 U.S. 300 (1920); Railroad Commission of Texas Y.
Rowan Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573 (1940).
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The Need for Modification of the Concept of the Police Power in
Regulation of Oil Well Nuisances
The need for modification of the concept of the police power in respect
to gas and oil is seen most clearly if we assume a situation in which the
drilling or operation of an oil well could constitute a nuisance of some
type. In that situation there is no question that the legislature and/or the
courts can prevent the owner from exercising the rights to drill and pump. 9
The California court in Larson v. Bush3" squarely placed the validity of such
regulations upon the strict nuisance theory. 1 It is submitted, however, that
because of the peculiar nature of gas and oil, such restriction upon the user
of land is constitutional only if there is some type of protection or compensation given to the person being regulated, unless all surface owners over
the pool are subjected to the same substantive restrictions.

The CaliforniaSupreme Court Has Refused to Rule on the Specific
Problem Under Question
In Bernstein v. Bush,3 2 on substantially the same facts as the Larson
case, the court disapproved the Larson holding3 3 on the theory that the court
had misconstrued the statute there involved.
It was held that the statute
was not merely a nuisance regulation, but a regulation to prevent waste,
conserve natural resources, or one involving all three elements. As such it
was held unreasonable to effect the legislative purpose in that it did not afford
adequate protection to the owners in the common pool. Once the court determined that the legislative intention was to regulate evils other than nuisance
the inquiry was terminated since the statute failed to offer any protection
at all. In the case of Hunter v. Justice's Court of Centinela Township,33"
a case arising after the amendment of the California Public Resources Code,
the court found the spacing provisions of section 3600 constitutional since
the Legislature had provided some degree of compensation in lieu of the
common-law right to drill an off-set well. The pertinent provisions of the
Resources Code provide that when section 3600 was applicable the person
"9Gant v. Oklahoma City, 289 U.S. 98 (1933) ; Marblehead Land Co. v. City of Los Angeles,
47 F.2d 528 (9th Cir. 1931).
8029 Cal.App.2d 43, 83 P.2d 955 (1938).
"1For title of the statute construed see note 34, infra.
220 Cal.2d 773, 781, 177 P.2d 913 (1947).
3
"Insofar as the decision in Larson v. Bush . . . is contrary to this conclusion, it is disapproved."
34
Stats. 1931, ch. 586, p. 1277; Deering's General Laws, Act. 5637, the title of which reads:
"An act to protect persons and property against danger from fire and explosion in petroleum oil
and gas wells by providing for the location of wells in relation to the outer boundary lines of the
property, public streets, roads and highways and other wells."
8 '36 Cal.2d 315, 223 P.2d 465 (1949).
"Stats. 1947, ch. 1559, p. 3200, Calif. Public Resources Code (Decring's Pocket Supp. 1951),
§§ 3600-3608.
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subject thereto should be included in the next largest contiguous lease. 7
The statute further provided that the person so included should receive in
money a pro rata share of the landowner's royalty determined in accordance
with the provisions of the lease in the proportion that the area of the land
bears to the aggregate of the total area covered by the total lease, not to be
less than a minimum pro rata share of one-eighth.38 This statutory scheme
was sustained as a reasonable regulation of waste, conservation, and/or
nuisance. Once the court found that it was a conservation measure the
theory seems to be that there is no question that the state has the power to
prevent or otherwise regulate drilling on one's property and also to include
the land with the next contiguous lease, but in so doing the state's power to

regulate is limited to the extent that some reasonable statutory scheme must
provide an interest in the oil recovered.
As has been pointed out above, the California courts have not clearly
distinguished among the motivating forces behind the spacing provisions
in section 3600. Unless the courts have adopted the view that there cannot
be a nuisance regulation without there necessarily being some element of
waste control or conservation, they should not, by the use of an erroneous
statutory construction, hold that a statute meant by the Legislature to be a
regulation of surface nuisances is one to protect correlative rights, prevent
waste, and conserve natural resources. The question is whether the courts
will follow the erroneous application of law made in the Larson case, which
they did not expressly overrule but merely disapproved, that such a regulation is an exercise of the traditional power to regulate nuisances and that
the state need not compensate the owners for the loss of their common law
right to drill an offset well.
The Larson Case Should Have Been Overruled
The position urged by this comment is that the Larson case should have
been overruled and not merely disapproved as a question of statutory construction. The court should force the legislature, through the limitations
of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses, to effect the same policy
of substituted protection that is demanded under the doctrine of correlative
rights in the field of conservation and waste, even assuming that the statute
had been aimed at regulation of nuisances. It is submitted that the limitation on the power of the state to regulate nuisances urged above is not merely
a question of the "more reasonable" means which the courts have denoted
a political question beyond judicial review. Rather it is a limitation
demanded by the constitutional limitations of due process in that the judicial
inquiry will be along the same lines as the issue described in the Hunter case.
"'Calif. Natural Resources Code § 3608.
"Id. § 3608.
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.. . [T]he question is whether the Legislature had any reasonable basis
for determining that the substitute provided for in Section 3608 for the right
to extract oil, was adequate, ... " and the Hunter case39 held the statute constitutional which ". . . guaranteed to such owner the most important part of
the lease-his share of the minimum royalty of one-eighth." Thus it is a
limitation in the sense that the Legislature must reasonably balance the
interests of the owners whose land overlies the common source.
The Peculiar Nature of Oil and Gas Makes Application of Traditional Nuisance Cases an UnreasonableDeprivationof Property
Were it not for the peculiar nature of gas and oil, the sovereign power
of the state to regulate for the protection of the health, safety, morals, and
general welfare, without giving the deprived owner any correlative protection
(the theory of the Larson case) would go unchallenged at this stage of our
constitutional development. But considering the peculiar characteristics of
the subject matter involved, the application of this traditional approach is
unwise since the harm resulting from such an application will not afford
equal treatment where by the use of acceptable concepts a fair and equitable
result could be achieved. The effect of the distinctive nature of the subject
matter involved and the error of the Larson case in the light of such facts can
be illustrated by the following comparisons.
In the typical constitutional regulation of nuisance the only benefit
which results is to the public at large, or at least a large body of the public.
This is not the case with oil and gas since they will flow to the area of lower
pressure. Assume that A owns Blackacre and B owns Whiteacre, which
properties have a common boundary and both of which overlie a single field
of oil and gas. If A is prohibited from drilling (because of the character
of the surrounding land or because of the small size or narrow shape of Blackacre, or its proximity to a public street) much of the oil and gas from under
Blackacre will drain over to Whiteacre as B continued to operate his wells.
True, the public highways adjoining Blackacre will be protected (against
a "public nuisance") and oil wells from Whiteacre and other adjoining
properties will be less subject to the danger from fire (both a public and a
private nuisance) but independent of these considerations there will be a
material and actual private benefit to B in that he will have received benefit
by reason of A's inability to drill. A loses not only the right to capture the
oil underneath his land, but also he loses the right to contract with respect
to that oil and gas and to give leases with respect to those minerals. Under
statutes providing for compulsory joinder without compensation, A can
lease his rights only to B; so long as B can draw the gas and oil from under
Blackacre without paying he will do so, and A has no bargaining position.
8036 Cal.2d 315, 318, 223 P.2d 465 (1950).
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A is deprived of the means of protecting himself from permanent damage
since he cannot drill a defensive "offset" well to reduce the pressure under
his own land to prevent the flow to Whiteacre.
It is submitted that if regulatory measures concerning oil and gas wells
are to be validated upon the ground of nuisance prevention they must recognize this basic difference between interests in oil and gas as distinguished
from other property interests and provide for some method of compensation
(balance of interest) to A for minerals which consequently flow over to
Whiteacre and enrich B. In lumping oil and gas cases with other nuisance
cases the reasoning of Larson v. Bush makes two basic errors: (1) The
reasoning fails to account for the fact that, while California recognizes no
property in "oil in place,"4 ° still the right to reach that oil is protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution.4 1 (2) The
reasoning fails to recognize that direct and substantial benefits flow from the
regulated land to that which may continue pumping oil and gas, thus permanently depriving the regulated owner of property rights.
In discussion of this second point it is enlightening to compare oil and
gas regulation to the case of Hadacheck v. Sebastian4 2 in which an ordinance
prohibiting operation of a brick kiln was upheld as constitutional, even though
there was a decline in the value of petitioner's property and no compensation
was given him for the loss.4 3 The similarities between the kiln and gas and
oil lie in the benefit to the public from reduction of dust, fumes, noise, and
dangers from fire. However, the clay under the property in the Hadacheck
case remained; it did not go to the benefit of other persons. If in the future
the character of the neighborhood changed, the owner would again be able
to operate his kiln upon that site and make economic use of the clay. Benefits
to other persons owning clay where kilns were still legal were indirect. This
differs from a prohibition upon drilling and pumping oil and gas, where,
as we have seen, the nature of these minerals gives a direct gain to those
still able to operate wells in the same field. Not only are oil and gas drained
off, but the reduction in pressure in the entire field makes improbable any
"Bernstein v. Bush, 29 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947) ; Tanner v. Title Insurance and Trust
Co., 20 Cal.2d 814, 129 P.2d 383 (1942) ; Western Oil and Refining Co. v. Venago Oil Corp., 218
Cal. 733, 24 P.2d 971 (1933) ; Black v. Solano County, 144 Cal.App. 170, 299 Pac. 843 (1931);
Stone v. Los Angeles, 114 Cal.App. 192, 299 Pac. 838 (1931).
"See note 16, supra.
"239 U.S. 394 (1915).
"Cf. ".... no question is made but that the general subject of the regulation of livery stables
.. is well within the range of the power of the state to legislate for the health and general welfare

of the people. While such regulations are subject to judicial scrutiny upon fundamental grounds, yet
a considerable latitude of discretion must be accorded to the lawmaking power, and so long as the
regulation in question is not shown to be clearly unreasonable and arbitrary and operates uniformly
upon all persons similarly situated in the particular district, the district itself not appearing to have
been arbitrarily selected, it cannot be judicially declared that there is a deprivation of property
without due process of law... 2,Reinman v. Little Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 176-177 (1915).
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recovery of those- minerals in the future, should the character of the neighborhood around the wells change.44
In the regulation of conventional users of land no form of substituted
interest is granted to equalize the loss of the property of the party regulated.
This is constitutional since the public benefit requires this form of regulation.
However, a need for compensation has been recognized as constitutionally
necessary when a health or safety measure benefits a small number of persons
directly. Mr. Justice Brandeis in the dissenting opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon recognized this in explaining the majority opinion of
Mr. Justice Holmes:
"The conclusion seems to rest upon the assumption that in order to

justify such exercise of the police power there must be an 'average reciprocity
of advantage' as between the owner of the property restricted and the rest
of the community; and that here such reciprocity is absent. Reciprocity
of advantage is an important consideration, and may be essential, where the
State's power is exercised for the purpose of conferring benefits upon the
property of neighborhood . . . (cases cited); or upon adjoining landowners. ..."45

It can be seen that in traditional cases the court has the choice of either
allowing the public to operate with attendant hardship of loss of economic
values to the landowner as in the Hadacheck case, or they must defeat the
public policy and allow the landowner to continue unregulated, as in the
Pennsylvania Coal Co. case. However, in the oil and gas regulations the
choice is not this "either-or" situation; there need be no hardship on the
landowner, and society can have the needed protection, even where those
protected form a relatively small segment of the population.
The Doctrine of CorrelativeRights Should Be Extended Beyond Its
Application as a Source of State Police Power
The doctrine of correlative rights is a further concept created by the
courts to meet a particular problem presented by the nature of oil and gas
where the doctrine of "no ownership in place" allowed members of the oil
and gas industry to engage in detrimental practices. In substance it allows
the state to regulate oil production where rights of one conflict with rights
of others. This doctrine was given emphasis in the case of Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana.46 In that case the state sought to enjoin the wasting of natural gas
to the air under a statute of the Legislature. Mr. Justice White held the act
constitutional, saying that while the owners overlying the common pool had
""In the Oklahoma City field a single 80-acre tract produced 2020 barrels per acre-foot, whereas
the original oil content was at most 1200 barrels per acre-foot .... The logical conclusion is that
this surplus oil migrated during exploitation from an undrilled area one-half mile northwest."
Landes, op. cit. supra, 175.
"5260 U.S. 393,422 (1922).
"0177 U.S. 190 (1899).
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a right to drill on their property and reduce as much oil to possession as they
could, still there was a limitation on such right.
"It follows . . . that the use by one of his power to seek to convert a
part of the common fund to actual possession may result in an undue proportion being attributable to one of the possessors of the right, to the annihilation
of the rights of the remainder. Hence . . . the legislative power . . . can be
manifested for the purpose of protecting all the collective owners, by securing
a just distribution, to arise from the enjoyment by them, of their privilege
'4 7
to reduce to possession and reach the like end by preventing waste."
This doctrine since the Ohio Oil case has served as a source of power
in the Legislature to regulate for the interests of the state and the individuals
concerned in the common pool. The general application occurs where the
uneconomic use of property by one results in damage to the interests of
other property ovmers in the same pool, or where the use results in the waste
of assets, an interest which the state feels necessary to protect. Thus the
wasting of gas adversely affects both private and public interests, since it
reduces the amount which the private person can later capture, and also
results in a reduction of the total amount of the natural resource which the

state has for later exploitation. To the extent that the doctrine is used as
a rationalization for the state to protect its own interests it is misused, since
the state is not a correlative owner within the meaning of the term. The
doctrine's true application arises where the principle of self-help embodied
in the theory of "No Ownership in Place" no longer serves to protect private
rights. Under the traditional common law, unless there were an actual
malicious non-trespassory invasion the party insured would be without any
remedy to prevent the wasteful use of a material in which he had a correlative right. California has adopted and correctly applied the doctrine to
cases involving spacing statutes.
"The decisions approving the regulatory legislation involved . . . were
based in part upon the legislative recognition and preservation of the correlative right of the surface owner, and the necessity of one landowner to make
productive use of his parcel in view of the equal right of the adjoining
land owners not to be deprived of correlative production from their parcels.
"Stautory regulations dealing with the location and spacing of wells have
been supported as constitutional because the equal treatment of the rights of
surface owners in the common source of supply, pr because they contained
provisions looking to the prevention of hardships upon owners in a particular
class." 48
The Doctrine of "No Ownership in Place" Does Not Prevent the
Necessity of ProtectingSuch Interests
The most probable reason motivating a court to treat an oil regulation
problem in the traditional nuisance manner lies in the oft-quoted concept
"177 U.S. at 210. The effect of this doctrine in California can be seen by comparing the
Bernstein case with the Hunter case.
"Bernstein v. Bush, 29 CaL2d 773, 780, 177 P.2d 913 (1947).
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that there is "no ownership of oil in place." 49 This view grew out of the
confusion attendant upon relating traditional property theory to a fugacious
mineral such as oil. However, upon analysis, this "No Ownership in Place"
doctrine is seen to be no impediment to a correct constitutional approach to
nuisance regulations affecting oil production.
The doctrine in its full vigor is properly applied in the situation where
self-help is available to all owners of land overlying a source of oil. That
is, the doctrine was designed to allow recovery of oil by all owners of land.
The problem met at its inception was to allow recovery without liability for
trespass where all owners are free to exercise these rights to bring up oil.
The doctrine is based on the concept that in balancing the interests involved,
protection in the form of self-help and free competition will effect an
equitable distribution. Hence, if an owner voluntarily elects not to capture
oil under his land there is no reason why others should not be allowed to
exercise their rights, and if he loses oil thereby it is because he as a free
agent has consented to the loss. When this doctrine of "No Ownership" is
cited to support a regulation, the effect of which is to bar certain owners (but
not all) from self-help, it gives rise to an entirely different question. It is
only equitable to speak of "No Ownership in Place" when all owners are
recognized as free agents to drill for and exploit the underlying oil resources.
There can be no comparison with the problem created when some are barred
from the exercise of the exploitive right so that its relative value to them
diminishes each day with its enjoyment by others.
The Surface Owner Has an Interest While Oil Is in.Place
The courts, under the doctrine of correlative rights, have recognized
the need for protection of regulated owners and have not been hindered by
the theory of "No Ownership in Place." It is submitted that the courts have
actually recognized a right of some kind in the oil itself, or have created
a concept of the right to drill and reduce to possession which in its expression
and application is so nearly analogous to a right in the oil itself that the two
cannot be separated. This recognition seems inherent in the doctrine of
correlative rights, and especially in the opinion of the California court in
the Bernstein case, which strongly affirmed that the right to drill and reduce
to possession was as much entitled to protection as the property itself.
The fact that this right or interest has not been accurately described to
date, being a conglomerate of "rights" to act (i.e., to drill, etc.) and of a
right in esse (i.e., correlative to those of other owners) and that it probably
will not bear accurate description in traditional property terms should not
"Bandini Petroleum Co. v. Superior, Court, 284 U.S. 8 (1931), affirming 110 Cal.App. 123,
293 Pac. 899 (1930); Western Oil and Refining Co. v. Venago Corp., 218 Cal. 733, 24 P.2d 971
(1933) ; Bernstein v. Bush, 20 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947).
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preclude the recognition here urged. Each time the courts have been called
upon to deal with the property interest of landowners overlying an oil pool,
they have moved towards recognition of an interest in the oil as such.50
If a name or term must be given, it could be described as one of that broad
grouping of "some sort of intangible interest," heretofore oft-manufactured
by the legal mind to assist analysis of subtle and involved problems. Perhaps,
borrowing a little from each point of view, it might be regarded as a fee
simple determinable, on condition that all like-situated parties be free agents
and/or be under limitations equally affecting the rights of each to protect
himself against the defeasance.
To date the courts have contented themselves with describing the overlying landowner's right as a "correlative right." This view will serve, since
it is recognized as a "property right" within the meaning of the United States
Constitution"' when the courts find the protection given to it is inadequate
in cases where only waste and/or conservation measures are involved. There
seems to be no realistic difference which should cause protection to be granted
in the one case (waste) and denied in the other (nuisance) . It is true that
there seems to be some distinction between the rationale whereby correlative
rights are jealously guarded with regard to waste measures, and the question
of protection versus interest raised by nuisance regulations. As a matter
of fact, the correlative rights doctrine has been more often used to support
waste measures under the police power, whereas a nuisance regulation is
based on the long-established power of the sovereign to regulate for health
and safety.
The Requirement of Balancing Interests Is Within the Policy of
Correlative Rights
As mentioned above, the correlative rights doctrine has usually been
applied to justify state regulation to protect such rights in a situation where
all owners act free of restraint as to oil exploitation and so may injure one
another as well as the public interest. On the other hand, in the nuisance type
situation, the wrong sought to be remedied is not to correlative rights but
to surface rights of others who may or may not be owners of overlying lands.
Thus it might be argued that a party committing an act which causes injury
"'Note the difference in emphasis in Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1899), the most
noted expression of the correlative rights view, and in Bernstein v. Bush, 20 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d
913 (1947), where the court emphasized the intrinsic value of the owner's "right to capture".
"'Bernstein v. Bush, 20 Cal.2d 773, 177 P.2d 913 (1947) ; Marrs v. R. R. Comm., 142 Tex. 293,
177 S.W.2d 941 (1944).
"'Courts have never failed to protect rights endangered under nuisance regulation, when the
classification theory was unreasonable. See, e.g., Sindell v. Smutz, 100 Cal.App.2d 10, 222 P.2d
903 (1950). However, the contention here is that even when reasonable in classification, in the case
of oil regulation the prohibited owner must he compensated or otherwise protected.
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deserves no protection and that correlative rights are not involved. 3 But that
is exactly the point at which the fundamental error occurs. As demonstrated
above, the regulation of activity of the owner in an oil field does not bar his
wrongful act with a consequential benefit to the public and at most an indirect
benefit to an actual or potential competitor; the regulation actually serves
to confiscate a valuable right of the prohibited party and to confer an unearned benefit upon other owners in the field. Thus, in the background of
oil field facts, there is no substantial difference between the two situations
(as to the right to be protected and the effect of the statute on such rights).
There is no reason why the rights of all should not be protected in regulation
of both nuisances and waste.
If the doctrine of correlative rights is justification in the waste situation
to protect the owner there barred against the still unrestricted operators in
the field (i.e., to equalize the correlative rights of all rather than to create a
statutory group of beneficiaries without any reciprocity whatever) then the
same considerations should be involved where nuisance legislation is involved,
notwithstanding the fact a nuisance constitutes an independent wrong.
The above should be thought of with the pooling provisions of the
California Public Resources Code in mind." Assuming such provisions as
found therein for minimum royalty of one-eighth to be adequate," the only
party with a conceivable cause for objection would be the adjoining landowner in whose holdings the rights of the barred owner would be "pooled."
But he has in fact suffered nothing; his values have in no way been diminished. In these oil cases, the fact that exploitation activities by one owner
constitute a nuisance should not prevent the courts from recognizing the
economic realities and requiring adequate protection for the barred owner
any more than in the waste situation where the fact that all have a right to
exploit the oil resource prevents the limitation of such right to protect some
owner from others.
Same ConsiderationsInvolved in an Action for Common Law
Nuisance
An objection which might be raised against this position is that a
nuisance can be enjoined by the courts in the absence of a statute if the use
comes within the concept of a common law nuisance. It might be urged that
while the courts do have power to enjoin a user of property which constitutes
a common law nuisance, in the absence of statutes authorizing joinder the
courts do not have the power to call in adjoining landowners and adjudicate
the rights involved. The objection might continue that if the courts have the
"aThis is not unlike the position of the California Supreme Court in Larson v. Bush, 20 Cal.
App.2d 43, 83 P.2d 955 (1938).
"'Calif. Public Resources Code §§ 3600-3608.
"Hunter v. Justice's Court, 36 Cal.2d 315, 223 P.2d 465 (1949).
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power to regulate without a joinder, the legislature must also have such
power. Actually, if the court is presented with such a situation, and a
nuisance is found to exist, the court should, under the requirements of the
California Code of Civil Procedure, 6 call in all owners and have their
interests determined. As in the case of owners with undetermined interests
in the same property (i.e., a trust fund) parties are indispensable where
a determination of the rights of one cannot be made without necessarily
determining the rights of others." This requirement seems to be made 5to8
order in this situation and is a condition to the jurisdiction of the court,
and should be so recognized. Thus the power of the court in the oil situation
is conditioned in like manner to that of the legislature. This is not to urge
that the court necessarily should in the absence of statute set up a comprehensive unit control for a field. In fact such an attempt was denied in
Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Insurance and Trust Co. 9 But there is no
reason why that case should be an obstacle to a determination by the court
of the correlative rights of owners overlying the oil field where one and all
are affected by an attempted nuisance injunction against one or some of
them.6"
Conclusion
The concept of necessary compensation and protection in nuisance regulation of oil and gas sets forth a more reasonable policy than any recognized
up to now. The policy recognized the state's traditional power to function in
protecting the public welfare by elimination of nuisances. It gives maximum
protection to the individuals concerned in preserving the equality of position
they enjoyed as free agents. The policy avoids forcing one owner alone to
suffer a detriment because the needs of society require that he be deprived
of his right to drill. Further, it confers no right beyond his pre-existing ability
to operate as a free agent on a par with other owners in a like situation.
"0Calif. Code of Civ. Proc. (Deering 1949), § 389.
"Bank of California National Association v. Superior Court in and for City and County of San
Francisco, 16 CaL2d 516, 106 P.2d 879 (1940).
"8Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73 P.2d 1163 (1937).
"'Western Gulf Oil Co. v. Title Insurance and Trust Co., 92 Cal.App.2d 299, 206 P.2d 643
(1949).
"'There is a vast difference between some determinations of correlative rights of indispensable
parties by courts in response to action of one without such rights which necessarily affect all, and
a court-imposed compulsory unitization of a field on the initiative of one who seeks to further his
own relative advantages. The distinction between situations in the Western Gulf case and the
position taken by the authors is found in the fact that therein the court was asked to find that
others acting as free agents were, by exercise of their common law right, committing a wrong to
the plaintiff therein. This comment deals merely with a situation where the plaintiff is being
deprived of his oil. Here the inquiry of the court is to determine to what extent as a physical
possibility adjoining landowners will actually capture oil and gas from under the plaintiff's landto that extent all parties are indispensable and the court is to balance the interests of all parties
so situated.

